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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea 
to a complaint filed against her under the old section 76-20-8 
of the Ctah Penal Code (repealed in 1973). The complaint in this 
matter arose from the purchase of an automobile from Lyle's Used 
cars in Ogden, Utah. The Defendant-Appellant paid Lyle's used 
cars an amount of one thousand dollars ($1000) in cash with the 
rest of the cost of the car to be financed. The State has alleged 
in its complaint that Mrs. Hunter made false statements in the 
credit application which was alleged to have been filled out by 
her, although the file contains no record whatsoever of said credit 
application. Defendant-Appellant was charged with obtaining money 
under false pretenses on September 20, 1913. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant-Appellant, upon the advise of appointed counsel, 
changed her not guilty plea to guilty and the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, District Court Judge for the Second Judicial District, 
County of Weber, State of Utah, sentenced her, the Defendant-
Appellant, to b.:. piaced under the supervision of the Adult Probation 
Department, one of the conditions of the probation agreement being 
that Defendant-Appellant should serve a term of sixty days (60) in 
the Weber County Jail. 
Subsequently Defendant-Appellant was returned to the Court for 
an alleged parole violation and was placed in the custody of the 
Department of corrections for a ninety-day (90) evaluation at the 
Utah State Prison. Upon completion of the evaluation, Defendant-
Appellant left the state of Utah and was subsequently arrested on 
1 
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or about March 14, 1977, and after having made ,via counsel 
a motion in arrest of judgment and for leave to withdraw a plea of 
guilty, Defendant-A~pellant was once again placed in the custody 
of the Department of Corrections for another ninety day evaluation 
at the Utah State Prison. The Motion in Arrest of Judgment and for 
Leave to Withdraw a Plea of Guilty having been denied by the court, 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, presiding. From this denial 
of the Motion in Arrest of Judgment and for Leave to Withdraw a Plea 
of Guilty, the Defendant-Appellant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 31st day of October, 1972, Defendant-Appellant 
purchased from Lyle's Used Cars in Ogden, Utah, a 1972 Chevrolet 
Station Wagon, having a total purchase price of $3,995.00. 
Defendant-Appellant paid Lyle's Used Cars one thousand dollars 
in cash at the time of sale and filled out an allegedly false 
credit application containing allegedly some false representations. 
A copy of this alleged false credit application cannot be located 
in the file nor can it be located after further inquiry from the 
Weber County Attorney or the Weber County Clerk's Office. SubsPquent 
to the sale of the car, Lyle's Used Cars through their agreement 
with the Bank of Utah was able to obtain financing in the amount of 
$2,995.00 plus sales tax and license amounting to a total of 
$3,185.00 for which Lyle's Used cars received a check in that amount 
from the Bank of Utah. 
In due time, Defendant-Appellant received a payment book and 
notice that she was to pay for the car at the rate of $107.03 per 
month for a period of 36 months. Defendant-Appellant obtained 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
insurance on the automobile as requested by the bank and further 
made the payments each month for a period of three months. At that 
time, Defendant-Appellant moved to Las Vegas in order to obtain 
employment there and because of her non-union status, was unable 
to find employment in Las Vegas, was unable to obtain welfare 
because of her non-residence and was thus unable to continue to 
make payments on the automobile •. 
On or about the 11th day of July, 1973, the Bank of Utah caused 
the automobile in question to be reposessed in Las Vegas,.Nevada, 
and further filed a complaint with the Weber :County Attorney's 
Office charging the Defendant-Appellant with obtaining merchandise 
by false representation, Section 76-20-8, the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
The Defendant-Appellant was subsequently-arrested in Nevada on a 
Utah Warrant and extradited to Utah where she was incarcerated in 
the Weber County Jail on or about the 20th day of September, 1973, 
and remained incarcerated unable to raise bail, having been refused 
O.R. release. 
The automobile was subsequently returned to Utah and sold by the 
Bank of Utah. 
Defendant-Appellant was arraigned on September 20, 1973, the 
Court having appointed Maurice Richards Esq. Attorney at Ogden, Utah, 
as appointed counsel for the Defendant. Defendant-Appellant 
originally pleaded not guilty. However, upon the advise of her 
appointed counsel, Defendant changed her plea to guilty on October 15, 
1973 and sentencing was set for November 5, 1973. On November 5, 1973, 
Defendant-Appellant was placed under the supervision of the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department and was ordered to serve a term of 
3 
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sixty days in the Weber County Jail. Defendant-Appellant 
subsequently served 60 days in the Weber County Jail and was released 
on the 21st day of December, 1973. 
Defendant-Appellant was again arrested on or about February 4, 1974 
and it was alleged that she had charged some gas at a service 
station in Ogden, Utah, ·such being a violation of her probation 
agreement. However, no probation agreement can be located in 
the files of this case nor has the Weber county Attorney or the 
Utah Department of Probation and Parole been able to furnish the same. 
Defendant-Appellant was also charged with another petty-crime 
alleged to have been committed several days after February 4, 1974, 
and as a result, on February 15, 1974 was ordered committed to the 
Board of Corrections at the Utah State Prison for a period not to 
exceed 90 days for an evaluation and study by John F. Wahlquist, 
Judge of the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County. 
Defendant-Appellant served 90 days at the Utah State Prison 
designated as a study and evaluation and upon the completion of this 
study was released O.R. and the information that is available indicates 
that she was told that if she would enroll in a nursing course with 
a goal of becoming a nurse that she would continue to be on her 
own recognizance and able to properly care for an live with her 
children. Defendant thus applied for the nurses training course 
under the auspice of the State of Utah and subsequently received 
a notification from the nursing school that she would be unacceptable 
as a student inasmuch as she had been shown to have bad moral 
character i.e. had been convicted of a felony. Upon learning this 
Defendant-Appellant in a desperate effort to care for her children 
4 
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and keep her family unit together, left the state of ,Utah not 
to return until 1977, at which time she purchased a home in 
Bountiful making a substantial down-payment where she lived with 
and cared for her six minor children, the youngest being less 
than one year old. 
On or about the 14th day of March, 1977, she was arrested by 
the Weber County authorities and incarcerated in the Weber county 
Jail. Attempts were made by her attorneys to gain acceptance 
of an Undertaking of Bond with the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 
Judge of the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber 
County. However, such Undertaking of Bond was refused and 
Defendant-Appellant remained incarcerated. 
On or about March 21st, 1977, which time was set for sentencing, 
she was again committed to the Board of Corrections at the Utah 
State Prison and at the Utah State Hospital for a 90 day psychiatric 
evaluation, pursuant to the order of District Judge, John F. 
Wahlquist, and the motions for Arrest of Judgment and for leave 
to withdraw her guilty plea and substitute a plea of not guilty 
were denied by the same Court and the Defendant-Appellant was 
incarcerated at the Utah State Hospital in Provo, Utah, for a period 
of approximately 45 days until being released on her own recognizance 
by an order of the Supreme court of the State of Utah on May 2, 1977. 
POINT 1 
THE LOWER COURT JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW A WITHDRAWAL OF A GUILTY PLEA AND A SUBSTITUTION 
OF A NOT GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO A MOTION MADE AT THE HEARING 
SET FOR IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE AND MOTIONS OF COUNSEL 
5 
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At a sentencing hearing held March 21, 1977, Defendant-
Appellant's attorney made a motion for a Leave to Withdraw 
a Plea of Guilty and Arrest of Judgment. s h 
uc motions were 
denied by the lower court judge (hearing transcript p. 6). 
It has been generally held that one who enters a plea to an 
accusatory pleading does not have the absolute right to 
withdraw the plea in order to file another plea. In the absence 
of a statute otherwise providing granting or refusing of Leave 
to Withdraw a Plea in a criminal case will rest in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, subject of course, to review 
for abuse of discretion. Good cause must always be shown for 
a change of plea. In other jurisdictions it has been stated 
that the discretion should always be exerci~ed in favor of 
innocence and liberty (Lambert vs. State, 245 Miss. 227, 
147 s. w. 2d 480; Henning v. State 184 Tenn. 508, 201 s. w. 
2d 669). 
Colorado Supreme Court in its opinion in the case of Champion 
vs. People 124 Colo. 253, 236 P. 2d 127 (1951) quoted 
14 Amer. Jur. Pru. p. 961, Sec. 287: 
"As in other cases of discretionary power, no general 
rule can be laid down as to when a Defendant will be 
permitted to withdraw his plea. The decision in each 
case must have been to a great extent on the particular 
attendant circumstances generally, however, it may be said 
that the withdrawal of a plea of guilty should not be 
denied in any case where it is in the least evidence 
that the ends of justice will be subserved by permittin9 
not guilty to be pleaded in its place. The least surprise 
of influence causing the Defendant to plead guilty when 
he has any defense at all should be sufficient ground~ 
for permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty. 
Leave should ordinarily be given to withdraw a p~ea of . 
guilty if it was entered by mistake or under a misconception 
of the nature of the charge; through a misunderstanding as . 
to its effect; through fear, fraud, or official misrep:esentation; 
was made involuntarily for any reason; or ev~n where it was 
entered inadvisadly if any reasonable ground is offered for 
going to the jury." 
6 
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The Court further quoted 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law s~c. 421, 
p. 642: 
"Accused should be permitted to withdraw a plea of guilty 
whic~ is con~rary to the truth *** Also the Court should 
permit the withdrawal of the plea where it appears that 
there is doubt of the guilt of the accused ***." 
The Court there went on to quote from an earlier case of 
Gearhart v. People 113 Colo. 9, 154 P. 2d 47 as follows: 
"The discretion thus repose in the court should be 
exercised ~ib~rally.in favor of life and liberty, 
but where it is plain that substantial justice will 
not be promoted or the substantial rights of Defendant 
prejudiced the application for leave to withdraw the 
plea should be denied. " 
The State of Montana in the case of State vs. McBane 
128 Mont. 369, 275 Pac. 2d 218 (1954) states the following: 
"All doubt should be resolved in favor of a trial on 
its merits." 
The court goes on further and quotes part of its opinion 
the aforementioned quotation from 14 Amer. Jur. Pru. Sec. 287 
P. 961. 
Utah has a statute governing the withdrawal of guilty 
pleas found in Section 77-24-3 Utah Code Annotated (195.3) 
which states: 
"The Court may at any time before judgment upon a plea 
of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn and a plea of not 
guilty substituted." 
The language of this statute would seem to impart that leave 
to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made by a trial court at 
its discretion subject, of course, to review by a Superior Court. 
The Attorney General has mentioned that a number of states 
with similar statutes have held that withdrawal of a guilty 
plea may be made only before judgment, namely the Arizona 
Supreme Court in the State vs. Churton 9 Ariz. App. 16, 448 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pac. 2d, 888 (1968); the Iowa Supreme court in the State vs. 
Jhinehart case 253 Iowa 1132, 125 N.W. 2d 242, 245 (19G3); 
state vs. Erfurt rendered by the Colorado Supreme Court 157 Colo. 
235, 402 Pac. 2d 75,77 (1965) although it should be mentioned 
that in the McBane and Champion cases cited earlier, the Colorado 
supreme court did in fact grant leave to withdraw a plea of guilty 
when the facts of the case so mandated its necessity. Also the 
California Supreme Court in People vs. Grant 16 Cal. App. 3d 27, 
93 Cal. Reporter 658 (1971) held that the statute allowed 
withdrawal of a guilty plea and substitution of a not guilty_plea 
only until the time of judgment. This Court in a previous case 
State vs. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 Pac. 2d 825 (1932) indicates 
that a plea of guilty may be withdrawn at any time after 
judgment. The Court in this case states as follows: 
"***the overwhelming weight of authority is that this 
provision confers a discretionary power upon the trial 
court to allow or disallow the change of plea*** the 
general rule in the adsence of statute is that it is 
discretionary with the court to permit or to refuse to 
permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn for the purpose 
of interposing a plea of not guilty, and the court's 
discretion in the matter will not be reversed except for 
an abuse of discretion." 
In this particular case Mr. Lee Lim was charged with murder 
in the second degree and had entered a plea of guilty and in the 
course of events had been sentenced to an indeterminate term in 
prison, which indeterminate sentence was later found to be not 
authorized by law and for that reason Mr. Lee Lim was to be 
resentenced. At this time he requested that he be given leave 
to withdraw his plea of guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty. 
No showing was made in any manner whatsoever that there was any 
evidence to indicate that he was not guilty of the crime or that he 
8 
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had not made a knowledgeable guilty plea th nor was ere any 
showing that he had made his guilty plea il:Jadvisedly or 
without the advise of counsel. The court goes on to state: 
"It was not made to appear that the Defendant had entered 
his plea of guilty in ignorance of his rights or that he 
was infl~enced unduly or improperly either by hope or fear 
or that i~ was entered by re~son of mistake or misapprehension 
or undue i~fluence. The motion was not supported by any allegations 
of fact which called for an exercise of discretion favorable 
to the request. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial 
court in refusing to permit Defendant to change his plea." 
Although no such factors were found in this case, the Court seemed 
to indicate that if a plea of guilty were entered in ignorance 
of your rights or if it were influenced unduly o~ improperly 
either by hope or fear or if it were entered by mistake or 
misapprehension or undue influence that the trial court would be 
obligated to permit a change of plea. Failing such action by 
the trial court, that the appellate court would over-rule 
the trial court and allow a change of plea in the interest of 
justice and liberty and in seeing that Defendant receives the 
benefit of every constitutional right and guarantee bestowed 
upon him by the Constitution of the State of Utah and of the 
United States. 
This court once again in the case of State vs. Plumb 14 
Utah 2d 124, 378 Pac. 2d 671 states that it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to determine whether or not to 
allow withdrawal of a guilty plea, subject to review by a 
superior court. However, the facts in this case also indicate 
that Defendant Plumb wished to change his plea after receiving 
the judgment and sentence from the district judge which was more 
severe than that which he had originally anticipated. 
9 
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In the case of State vs. Larsen 560 Pac. 2d 335, .Defendant 
Larsen sought to withdraw a plea of guilty after receiving a 
jail sentence upon a guilty plea for the possession of marijuana. 
In the State of Utah vs. William Forsyth 560 Pac. 2d 337 (1977) 
Defendant sought to withdraw a guilty plea following plea bargaining 
with the prosecution which resulted in the dismissal of four counts 
of a five count indictment against him. This court reviewed th~t 
case finding that refusal to allow a change of plea was the 
discretion-of the trial court but that it could be reversed on 
the basis of abuse of discretion but that in that particular case 
Defendant was fully aware and had participated in plea bargaining 
sessions with the prosecution and that pursuant to these negotiations 
with the presecution, Defendant had freely made the choice, 
fully informed, w.i thout undue influence, to plead guilty. I-t 
would seem to be established then, that this court has amply 
demonstrated on other occasions that it can and will review 
situations such as the one at bar in which a Defendant seeks 
to withdraw a plea of guilty and substitute a not guilty plea 
when the same have been denied such a change of plea by the trial 
court. Such a denial by the trial court may be over-ruled by 
this court upon a finding that the trial court abused its discretion 
It should be.noted that in all of the above and aforementioned 
cases Defendants do not allege that new evidence has appeared 
showing that the crime was not committed ·nor do they allege that 
they were unduly influenced or under duress or that they were 
illadvised or that they had no knowledge of the facts upon which 
the crime as charged was constituted. Rather they seek to withdraw 
their guilty plea as a result of the imposition of a sentence which 
10 
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was more severe than that which they had anticipated.. Their 
situation contrasts markedly with the situation of the Defendant-
Appellant presently at bar. Although the court in this 
preceeding does not ordinarily consider evidence, leaving that 
function to the trial court, it is certainly essential to the 
consideration of this case that the facts underlying and upon 
which the crime was charged be presented and it is certainly 
fundamental to the case that this Court be presented with 
the facts which have arisen and been brought to light subsequent 
to the entrance of the plea of guilty and the incarceration of 
the Defendant-Appellant. 
Defendant-Appellant is an uneducated woman, having left school 
at the age of fifteen years to run away with an older man. She 
is presently the mother of six children, the youngest being less 
than two years of age at this writing. She lives in Bountiful 
in a home which she purchased approximately two years ago. 
On the 31st day of October, 1972, She purchased from Lyle's 
Used Cars in Ogden, Otah, a 1972 Chevrolet Station Wagon having 
a total price of $3,995.00. She paid one thousand ($1,000.00) 
dollars downpayment filling out an allegedly false credit 
application, a copy of which I have been unable to locate. 
Lyle's Used cars obtained financing for the balance of the 
price of the car through the Bank of Utah in the amount of $2,995.00 
plus sales tax and license bringing the total finance to $3,185.00, 
which payment was made from Bank of Utah to Lyle's Used Cars. 
Defendant subsequently obtained insurance on the automobile 
and made three payments in the amount of $107.03 each upon the car, 
certainly probitive of her intent in purchasing and paying for the 
--
11 
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automobile. 
• 
She then moved to Nevada where she hoped to obtain work 
as a waitress in a casino but was precluded from obtaining such 
due to union contracts in the state and was unable to receive 
welfare and thus was unable to Fay for the car. 
It is ironic that at ttis point, due to the death of her 
former husband approximately two years earlier that she was 
eligible for approximately five or six hundred dollars per month 
in survivor benefit payments to her children but that due to 
the stubborness of the Federal bureaucracy of the Social Security 
system, she was not able to receive such payments until 1975, 
at which time she received a lump sum payment which was used 
as a downpayment on her home. Had she be~n receiving these 
Social Security payments which were the right of the children 
and herself in 1972 and 1973 as she should have been, it is 
doubtful that she would have had this problem and would have 
been able to make the payments on the automobile as intended. 
Because she was unable to find work, she was unable to make 
such automobile payments and in approximately July 1973, the 
automobile in question was repossessed in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
with Bank of Utah causing a complaint to be filed against her 
in Weber County, Utah. She was arrested in Nevada and extradited 
to Utah and incarcerated in the Weber County Jail, to be held 
without bond. Subsequent to that time, she has spent approximately 
nine months in the jails and prisons of the State of Utah. The 
following information was unknown to her inasmuch as she had no 
way to discern it and also apparently was not known to her attorney 
at the time she changed her plea to guilty and was sentenced. 
12 
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However, from the records of the Bank of Utah, the f~llowing 
has been learned and it certainly would seem to be significant 
in terms of whether the Defendant was guilty of the crime of which 
she was charged. 
Bank of Utah records show that a check was issued in the 
amount of $3,185.00 to Lyle's Used Cars. After the repossession 
of the car, the Bank of Utah received a high bid in the amount 
of $3,055.00, at which price the automobile was sold. Subtracting 
$3,055.00 from $3,185.00 leaves the bank with a $130.00 loss. 
Section 59-15-5 of the Utah Code Annotated {1953) dealing with 
sales tax would indicate that in the event of a repossession made 
under the terms of the sales contract which would be the 
case in this situation, the vendor would be entitled to a 
refund credit or rebate of the sales tax on the uncollected 
balance of the sales price. Deducting this sales tax 
refund in the amount of $137.00 which should have been 
the amount of the rebate from the $130.00 loss, leaves the bank 
at this point with a profit of $7.00. Adding to that $7.00 profit 
the $321.09 payments which were made by the Defendant-Appellant 
during the time she had the car, we arrive at a $328.09 gain 
to the bank. Calculating interest at the approximate rate of 
13 and 1/2 % would indicate that without allowing for payments 
made in terms of reduced interest that interest on that amount 
for the period of time whicn she had the car would be approximately 
$287.00 which leaves the bank with a $41.00 profit on the transaction. 
It would appear from these facts that Lyle's Used Cars lost 
nothing inasmuch as they were paid completely and in full for 
the automobile which they sold. The Bank of Utah lost nothing 
13 
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inasmuch as they were completely repaid on their loan together 
with interest. The only person who seemed to lose on this 
transaction was the Defendant-Appellant who paid an amount in 
excess of $1,300.00 plus insurance on this automobile and 
received its use for a period of approximately eight months 
and has since then spent nine months incarcerated in Utah jails 
and prisons and a considerably longer amount of time under threat 
of incarceration as a result of this transaction. 
It is clear from a perusal of the records that the automobile 
was sold to the Defendant-Appellant only because of the one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in cash which she had as a downpayment. 
The logic of both the bank and car dealer being that with that 
large a downpayment, the repossess.ion could always be made 
thus minimizing or eliminating any risk whatsoever for the dealer 
or the bank. 
Under the code section which the Defendant-Appellant was 
charged and convicted, which is Code Section 76-20-B Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) which is the old section which was repealed 
and replaced by .another section shortly after the acts of the 
Defendant-Appellant took place. It reads as follows: 
"OBTAINING MONEY BY FALSE PRETENSES-Every person who knowingly 
and designedly, by false or fraudulent representati~ns or. 
pretenses, obtains from any other person any chose in actio~, 
money, goods, wares, chattels, effects or other valuable.thing, 
with intent to cheat or defraud any person of the same, if the 
value of the property so .obtained does not exceed $50, is 
punishable as in cases of petit larceny, and when the property 
so obtained is of the value of more than $50, the person so 
offending is punishable as in cases of grand larceny." 
The controlling rule under which a person was convicted 
under the foregoing statute was laid down in State vs. Casperson, 
71 Utah 68, 262 Pac. 294 in which is was stated: 
14 
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"The essential element of crime of obtaining money by 
false pretenses was commission of actual fraud; Pretense 
must have been false in fact; If the victim gets what was 
pretended and what he bargained for there was no fraud 
or prejudice; " 
This rule was followed in the case of the State vs. Morris 
5 Utah 210, 38 Pac. 2d 1097 (1934): 
"***The only reasonable inference, however, which may be 
drawn from the evidence before us is that the purchase 
corporation receive, and at the time of the trial 
securities satisfy, the amount owing upon the contract 
which is purchased. Under such facts may it be said 
that the Defendant is guilty of the crime for which he 
stands·convicted? We are of the opinion that the question 
must be answered in the negative. Before recovery may be 
had in a civil action on the grounds of fraud, it must 
be established that the complaining party has sustained some 
damage on account of the fraud. Were this a civil case 
in which the purchasing company was seeking a money judgment 
against the Defendant on account of the fraud complained of, 
no recovery could be had because the evidence fails to show 
that the purchasing company sustained any injury. The mere 
fact that a party to a transaction may not have received all 
they bargained for, does not give rise to civil liability. 
For stronger reasons the crime of obtaining money by 
false pretenses is not established in the absence of 
evidence showing, or tending to show, that the claimed 
victim has sustained a pecuniary or property loss 
by reason of the transaction relied upon." 
The cases that followed, i.e. State vs. Timmerman 
88 Utah 481, 55 Pac. 2d 1320 (1936) and State vs. Nuttal 
16 Utah 2d 171, 397 Pac. 2d 797 (196~) the following rules 
seem to have been set down. Under 76-20-8 Utah Code 
Annotated(l953) the following elements and proof of them had to 
concur. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
There must have been false or fraudulent representations 
or pretenses. 
Representations must have been made knowingly and 
designedly. 
There must have been concurring intent to cheat or . 
d f to Whom the false or fraudulent representations e raud persons 
or pretense were made. 
Something of value must have been obtained because of 
false or fraudulent representation or pretens~s. 
Party to whom false or fraudulent represe~tation . 
or pretenses were made must have parted with something 
, c; 
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-of value in reliance upon false or fraudulent 
b 1 . representations or pretenses e ieving them to be true. 
In this instance the automobile dealer as is charged in the 
complaint, parted with nothing inasmuch as he received $1000.00 
downpayment and was paid the rest in full by the Bank of Utah 
within a very short period of time. 
The Bank of Utah lost nothing inasmuch as payments were made 
upon the automobile and when the payments were not made upon the 
said automobile, the bank repossessed and sold the automobile 
showing a profit on the transaction. 
Defendant-Appellant obtained nothing of value inasmuch as 
for the time period for which she used the automobile in question 
she paid the amount of approximately $1,300.00. 
In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances which have 
been and were uncovered subsequent to the entrance of the guilty 
plea while Defendant-Appellant was incarcerated in the Weber 
County Jail, Defendant-Appellant believes that substantial 
evidence and cause exists to justify the granting of leave to 
withdraw a plea of guilty inasmuch as it was entered by mistake 
and under amisconception of the nature of the charge. The State 
of Utah has no valid interest and or compunction to justify the 
further prosecution or the denial of a chance to prove her innocence 
in a court of law to the Defendant-Appellant when such convincing 
evidence and proof of her probable innocence by virtue of the 
failure of any of the parties involved to part with anything of 
value or to sustain any loss. The· interests of the State of Utah 
of the judiciary of the prosecutor's office should run heavily 
toward vindication of those who have been accused wrongly and the 
protection of parties who may be parties and citizens of the State 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
of Utah who may be innocent of crimes of which they have been 
charged. Judges and trial judges in particular it would appear 
should have the duty of ascertaining the probability of guilt 
or innocence of parties which appear before them and when 
probability of such innocence does appear or is made known to 
the court it would seem to clearly be an abuse of discretion 
when such party making the allegation of innocence or facts 
which might show such innocence is denied the opportunity of 
presenting such evidence to the Court in order to prove such 
innocence and gain liberty for the party involved. This is 
especially true in Defendant-Appellant's case when as the 
mother of six children to support and care for, she 
stands accused of a felony and in danger of loosing her liberty 
and her means to support her children as well as the love and 
affection of the children . The children through no wrong 
doing of their own stand to lose the support and affection 
and discipline of their mother. Every conceivable effort 
should be made and every conceivable lenience should be shown 
• to allow her to ·prove her innocence and to remove herself from 
the possibility of incarceration. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS REPRESENTED BY INEFFECTIVE 
AND PERHAPS INCOMPETENT .COUNSEL AND AS SUCH, DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT WAS NOT AWARE OF HER RIGHTS NOR WAS SHE INFORMED 
ENOUGH TO MAKE AN INTELLIGENT, KNOWING DECISION AT THE TIME 
HER PLEA WAS CHANGED FROM NOT GUILTY TO GUILTY. 
Defendant-Appellant, upon her incarceration and arraignment 
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received benefit of court appointed counsel inasmuch as she was 
indigent and unable to provide her own. Such counsel, the records 
shows, attended several hearings and urged her to change her plea 
to guilty apparently in an effort to resolve the case as exi;edixiousl"· 
as possible and to avoid further work, discomfort and the consumption 
of further time on the part of counsel. Such records from the Bank 
of Utah as have been perused in order to bring forth the facts 
as set forth earlier were apparently not investigated by appointed 
counsel _nor did there seem to be any interest on the part of 
appointed counsel in seeking to see that the County Attorney bring 
such records into Court. 
Defendant-Appellant left school at the age of fifteen having 
attended only up until the eighth grade and certainly was not 
educated or versed in the law enough to have any conception of 
how to provide for her own defense. Rather she relied upon the 
counsel which had been provided for her by the Court and such 
counsel apparently made no effort whatsoever to ascertain any of 
the facts of the case and provide any defense whatsoever for the 
Defendant-Appellant. Counsel of this nature would seem to 
deprive the Defendant of her constic~utional right to have and 
to make a knowing, willful and intelligent decision regarding 
changing her plea from not guilty to guilty. For these reasons 
the Defendant-Appellant should have been allowed by the trial 
judge to change her plea from guilty to not guilty and thus have 
been given the chance to prove her innocence and remove the 
threat of incarceration clouding her life at the present time. 
· d that i'nasmuch as Defendant received Further, it can be maintaine 
ineffective counsel she was thus denied her constitutional right 
18 
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of counsel at all stages of proceedings and made afr 
unknowing, illadvised and mistaken change of plea and thus 
the trial court could be said to have abused its discretion 
in failing to allow Defendant-Appellant to withdraw her guilty 
plea and substitute a plea of not guilty. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S INCARCERATION IN THE WEBER COUNTY 
JAIL AND FAILURE TO OBTAIN RELEASE WITHER ON HER OWN 
RECOGNIZANCE OR ON BOND DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE TRIAL 
OF THIS MATTER TENDED TO PUT HER UNDER DURESS AND EXERT 
UNDUE INFLUENCE TOWARD THE WITHDRAWAL OF A NOT GUILTY PLEA 
AND THE ENTRANCE OF A GUILTY PLEA IN AN EFFORT TO BRING HER 
INCARCERATION TO AN END AND FIND OUT WHAT THE NATURE OF HER 
SENTENCE WOULD BE. THUS, ELICITING A GUILTY PLEA IN AN 
EFFORT TO GET THE MATTER OVER WITH. 
The record shows that Defendant-Appellant was incarcerated 
either in the jails of the State of Nevada or in the Weber County 
Jail from a period beginning in July 1973 and was held without 
possibility of release having been denied O.R. release and un~ble 
as being indigent to obtain release on bond. Defendant thus being 
incarcerated had no way to investigate the facts leading to her 
arrest to peruse the bank's records or to in any other way prepare 
defense. Such defense had to be prepared by her appointed counsel 
or by others whom the State might appoint for that purpose and 
of course, in the interest of the State, her interests were not 
paramount by her counsel in preparing her defense. Thus, through 
incarceration and failure to obtain release on bond, Defendant was 
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any bank records which might be pertinent to her defense. Had 
she been able to obtain release, an intelligent per~sal of the 
bank records perhaps through consultation with her attorney, may 
have shown that she had some defenses to the crime of which she 
was charged. Her incarceration made that impossible and thus 
it would seem such inca~ceration would put her under duress and 
would unduly influence her decision to plead guilty and get it 
all over with more quickly, not even knowing that she had some 
possible defenses to the crime with which she was charged. For 
these reasons her conviction upon her guilty plea should be 
set aside and such matter shaild be remanded to the lower court 
for a trial of a matter on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT THEREFORE MAINTAINS THAT THE LOWER COURT 
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW HER TO WITHDRAW HER PLEA OF GUILTY AND 
SUBSTITUTE A NOT GUILTY PLEA ABUSES DISCRETION, WHICH DISCRETION 
SHOULD BE FREELY USED IN THE FAVOR OF INNOCENCE, LIBERTY AND 
TRIALS AND PROOF OF CASES OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE UPON THE MERITS 
OF FACT WHICH HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED IN THIS CASE CLEARLY SHOW 
THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS A DEFENSE TO THE CRIME OF WHICH SHE 
WAS CHARGED AND THAT PERCHANCE, AS A MATTER OF FACT, IS NOT GUILTY 
OF ANY CRIME WHATSOEVER. BUT, THAT DETERMINATION SHOULD CERTAINLY 
BE MADE IN A TRIAL COURT. IT IS HARD TO SEE ANY VALID PURPOSE 
OR ANY JUSTIFIABLE REASON WHY THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD SEEK TO 
INCARCERATE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHEN EVIDENCE EXISTS AND CAN BE. 
SUBSTANTIATED UPON THE BANK'S RECORDS THAT IN FACT, SUCH A CRIME 
AS CHARGED WAS NEVER COMMITTED. 
The thought that Defendant-Appellant has up until this time 
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spent nine (9) months in the prisons and jails of the state of Utah 
for a crime which she may in effect may not have committed, for a 
crime in which no one was defrauded, no one lost any money, would 
seem to be repugnant to the American ideal of fair play, equality, 
and justice for its citizens. This woman and her children have 
been punished enough, in fact, have been punished excessively 
for an act which the State has constituted a crime, an act of 
which there were no victims except for the Defendant-Appellant 
herself. 
Our system of justice is not so harsh that it demands that the 
State continue persecuting someone under these circumstances. 
The lower court's denial of the motion and request to withdraw 
the guilty plea and to enter a plea of not guilty should be 
reverse~ and the case remanded to the District Court for a trial 
on the merits in which all evidence pertinent to the case 
may be presented. 
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